



The basic claim of this chapter is that humanism in Africa cannot be discussed 
in isolation from issues pertaining to tradition and modernity. To be sure, 
this conceptual pair has been central to many attempts at understanding 
Africa. The general assumption has largely been the interchangeable 
nature of African life ways with tradition. In other words, what is African 
is traditional because Africa is traditional anyway. This paper takes a 
diﬀ erent perspective by cautioning against the failure to distinguish African 
life ways from tradition. The paper argues that this failure is responsible 
for the assumption that there is something intrinsically humanistic about 
African life ways, the search for which does not present any special problem. 
In fact, precisely because Africa and tradition are very distinct entities, any 
attempt at understanding humanism in Africa must start by appreciating 
the diﬃ  culties which the concept of humanism poses.
At the centre of the discussion in this chapter is the Enlightenment 
understanding of humanism. Drawing from Kant, Fichte and Leibniz 
through Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe and Schiller to Jean-Paul Sartre 
in more recent times, this paper deﬁ nes humanism as the search for the 
fulﬁ llment of the individual under conditions which place the onus on 
human agency molded within the framework of a history made possible 
by social action. Such an understanding of humanism reveals immediately 
that the assumption that African life forms may be naturally associated with 
humanism is a highly problematic one. More fundamentally however, it 
can be argued without being overly deterministic that humanism requires 
the fulﬁ llment of certain social conditions in order to obtain. Furthermore, 
such conditions are modern in nature and can hardly obtain in a traditional 
setting. African societies may be humane in the way that many societies 
are, but they are not humanistic in the strict sense of the word. The African 
continent has, however, been undergoing processes of social change which 
have placed humanism on the African agenda. Those processes, which are 
historical in nature, will be at the centre of this paper.Bereitgestellt von | Universit etsbibliothek Basel
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It may appear strange to approach the issue of humanism in Africa 
through a detour that takes us through the tradition/modernity dichotomy. 
Yet no conceptual pair has been so central to the retrieval of Africa as an 
object of social scientiﬁ c inquiry than this one. Ignoring it would be at the 
cost of a fuller understanding of the matter at hand. There is a lot to the 
assumption that Africa and the traditional are somehow interchangeable. In 
fact, there is a lot more than the problematic implication that all cultures are 
humanistic in nature and the task of any inquiry into humanism in diﬀ erent 
cultural settings consists in ﬁ nding essential home-grown forms.
While the tradition/modernity dichotomy may be seen as problematic 
in more ways than one, it still remains important for the conceptual 
clariﬁ cation which it can reveal in attempts at understanding the sociology 
of culture in diﬀ erent settings. Probably the most objectionable aspect of the 
dichotomy, one which has not ceased to fuel intense debates about the role of 
ethnocentrism in the social sciences, is the teleological assumption made by 
modernization theories concerning the fate of societies held to be traditional. 
This assumption held that such societies would not only undergo processes 
of social change which would make them increasingly more like Western 
society but more importantly, it was based on the belief that a change in 
such terms was unavoidable and desirable. In this respect, the history of 
European contact with Africa can be understood as the history of the attempt 
to bring this historicist claim into fruition. Early critical comments on 
anthropology for example, blamed the discipline for aiding colonial rulers in 
their enterprise (Leclerc 1972). Even developmental aid in our own day has 
been subjected to harsh criticism for the same reasons. 
The charge against anthropology was that it helped create an image of 
non-European societies which made them inevitable objects of European 
civilizing intervention. These societies were depicted as timeless cultural 
black holes incapable of eﬀ ecting change themselves. A very symptomatic 
oﬀ shoot of such charges was the discussion that pitted Marshal Sahlins, 
a well known American anthropologist against Gananath Obeyesekere, 
a Princeton-based psychoanalyst and anthropologist originally from Sri 
Lanka. The latter took issue with the description of the role of mythological 
thinking and practice provided by the former to account for the death of the 
legendary Captain Cook (Obeyesekere 1992) in the Paciﬁ c. Sahlins (Sahlins 
1987) had argued that Hawaiians had slain Captain Cook on the wrong, but 
well-grounded assumption, that he was the cyclically returning God Lono, 
who, following tradition, should be ritually killed. Obeyesekere, in contrast, 
argued that Captain Cook had fallen victim to profane considerations which, 
in the ﬁ nal analysis, had dictated his death. In other words, Obeyesekere was 
arguing that to account for social action among seemingly backward non-
European cultures and societies, one required the same interpretive skills 
and frames of reference that were necessary everywhere. The assumption 
that social action could be accounted for diﬀ erently appeared to oﬀ end 
Obeyesekere’s sense of universalism in approaching anthropology.
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perhaps even a normative level; they may be problematic to the extent that 
they are silent on structural diﬀ erences among societies and the role which 
these diﬀ erences may play in encouraging patterns of behavior, attitudes 
and beliefs. Terms like “simple societies” or “complex societies” may be 
objectionable on the grounds that they draw from an ethnocentric position 
which places Europe as the standard and thereby fails to acknowledge 
the diverse ways in which a society may be simple or complex, for that 
matter. Yet they aim at a much more subtle point of extreme importance 
in appreciating the nature of social action in diﬀ erent settings. Durkheim’s 
discussion of forms of integration (Durkheim 1978) and their eﬀ ects on 
the division of social labor were not only mere classiﬁ catory contrivances 
against the Rest (as opposed to the “West”), but rather attempts at making 
available to analysts ways of appreciating the richness of social relations. The 
same goes to Ferdinand Tönnies useful distinction between Gemeinschaft 
(community) and Gesellschaft (society) (Tönnies 1963). Towards the end of 
his celebrated Science as a Vocation, Weber presents an image of the “savage” 
which provides valuable insights not only into the nature of modern society, 
but also into the rich texture of individual responsibility for one’s fate that 
went lost in the transition to modernity. He writes: 
Does it mean that we, today, for instance, everyone sitting in this hall, have a 
greater knowledge of the conditions of life under which we exist than has an 
American Indian or a Hottentot? Hardly. Unless he is a physicist, one who rides 
on the streetcar has no idea how the car happened to get into motion. And he 
does not need to know. He is satisﬁ ed that he may “count” on the behavior of 
the streetcar, and he orients his conduct according to this expectation; but he 
knows nothing about what it takes to produce such a car so that it can move. The 
savage knows incomparably more about his tools. When we spend money today I 
bet that even if there are colleagues of political economy here in the hall, almost 
every one of them will hold a diﬀ erent answer in readiness to the question: How 
does it happen that one can buy something for money – sometimes more and 
sometimes less? The savage knows what he does in order to get his daily food and 
which institutions serve him in this pursuit. The increasing intellectualization 
and rationalization do not, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge 
of the conditions under which one lives (Weber 1946: 142).
No social scientist today would speak as candidly as Weber did. Many today 
might even take oﬀ ence at the language used by Weber. However, there is a 
lot of structural wisdom in Weber’s remarks which boils down to the need 
to pay attention to the context within which forms of conduct, attitudes and 
beliefs emerge. By the same token, claims about humanism in Africa must 
be tempered by careful analysis of the societal context within which certain 
properties of social action are thought to be manifestations of humanism. 
Indeed, as I will further contend, there has been a tendency within African 
Studies to see social phenomena occurring in Africa as features of the 
essence of African culture, when such phenomena might be more adequately B reitg stellt von | Universit etsbibliothek Basel
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understood and analyzed as structural properties of a very speciﬁ c type of 
society. The binary opposition between tradition and modernity has become 
problematic over the years. One reason for this has been the manner in which 
the opposition was used to make veiled commentaries about the natural 
order of things – cultures and individuals – on the assumption that certain 
societies and individuals, i.e. the West and Westerners, occupied a privileged 
place on the evolutionary ladder.
However, as the persistence of problems in state building in Africa 
adamantly reminds us, we may have been too quick in disposing of the 
opposition for descriptive and analytical purposes. It does not appear logical 
to argue for an essentialist view of African culture, which is the case when 
some extol hospitality and communalism as intrinsically African, and in 
the same breath refuse to place the blame on Africa and Africans for their 
inability to achieve political, economic and social stability. Again, as I will 
show, some view this inability as a form of resistance by Africans against 
external forces. What is illogical about such essentialist views of course is the 
rather a-historical assumption that societies and cultures are self-contained 
entities subject to no external inﬂ uences and, even worse, likely to degenerate 
once they come into contact with the outside world.
Tradition and modernity matter. A useful discussion of humanism in 
Africa must engage with these concepts. To put it diﬀ erently, only a clear 
identiﬁ cation of what in African life is a clear manifestation of the presence of 
traditional or modern elements will pave the way for an analytically coherent 
discussion of humanism in Africa. Ironically, Africa’s history, especially the 
role of colonialism and to a lesser degree, developmental aid, has been crucial 
in placing humanism at the centre of African attempts to deﬁ ne a place for 
itself in the concert of world societies and cultures. Indeed, my claim is 
that humanism in Africa, just as Africa itself (cf. Macamo 1999), is a very 
modern construct. In other words, African humanism is the product of the 
manner in which Africans responded to the gauntlet of history by seeking to 
make sense of their worlds. In the process, they made their worlds anew. The 
much exalted “Ubunthu” philosophy in South Africa, for example, is in very 
important respects not so much the revelation of an essential cultural truth 
as a critical intellectual repositioning of Africans vis-à-vis their ambivalent 
experience of modernity (Macamo 2005).
Africa and Humanism
The idea of humanism in Africa faces a paradox. On the one hand, there 
is a tendency to stress the humanity of African ways of life, based as they 
have been assumed to be, on generosity, hospitality, communalism and a 
profound respect for human life. Key political philosophies in the course of 
the struggles for emancipation from colonial rule and oppression repeatedly 
emphasized these aspects. While Julius Nyerere (Nyerere 1968), Tanzania’s 
ﬁ rst post-colonial leader, sought in communalism the roots of a moral a Bereitgestellt v n | Universitaetsbibli thek Basel
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political order for his country, Kenneth Kaunda (Kaunda 1976), Zambia’s 
ﬁ rst post-colonial leader, believed to have found in mutual aid and respect 
principles of African humanism which, like Nyerere’s Ujamaa, would 
underpin his society’s moral and political order. Several versions of “African 
socialism”, from Leopold Sénghor’s (Sénghor 1964), Modibo Keita’s of Mali 
to Ahmed Sekou Touré’s of Guinea Conackry1 insisted on the idea that 
African ways of life had innate humanist qualities which could be harnessed 
to buttress the political order.
On the other hand however, the dominant perception of Africa in the world, 
particularly the perception informed by the images conveyed by the global 
media, is that of a continent with a very tenuous relationship to any notion of 
humanism whatsoever. The preference for news reporting on Africa which 
refuses to seriously engage with the logic of social action on the continent, 
opting instead for simplistic accounts based on such ideas as (a;) African 
political elites are self-serving, (b;) Africans are not interested in developing 
themselves, (c;) Africans are out to live oﬀ  world compassion, (d;) Africans 
have, among other things, a diﬀ erent mentality – these only help to heighten 
the sense of a fundamental contradiction between Africa and humanism. The 
exploitation of this sense of contradiction can make best-sellers as a recent 
book published by a journalist in France purporting to discuss what it calls 
“négrologie” clearly documents (Smith 2003). Even serious publications have 
a hard time ﬁ nding the right tone when coming to terms with what is going 
on across the continent as Achille Mbembe, one of the best African scholars, 
appears to be admitting his failure to ﬁ nd the right frame of mind to analyze 
or merely grasp what is going on (Mbembe 1992: 1-30).
Africa is indeed a continent characterized by cultures and societies 
which observe hospitality and solidarity to a striking degree, considering the 
increasingly atomized lives which modernity demands from individuals and 
societies. Hospitality and solidarity are particularly marked in rural areas. 
One may be tempted to explain the prevalence of these habits in rural areas 
with reference to the assumption that these areas are conservative by nature, 
and therefore, preserve original cultural forms. While the presence of cultural 
forms is a reliable indicator of their presence in the society in question, 
this might be just about all that can be said of hospitality and solidarity in 
African rural areas. More in line with the argument of this chapter is the 
assumption that African rural areas are the way they appear to be for reasons 
linked to their stronger propensity to what we might generally call traditional 
ways of life. In fact, hospitality and solidarity seem to have a conspicuous 
presence in many traditional societies. There are very good functionalist 
explanations for this, chief among which I could single out those provided 
by the German sociologist and social anthropologist, Georg Elwert (Elwert 
1991). Elwert argued that reciprocity was central to the survival strategies 
of small-scale communities, especially in the absence of over-arching social 
1 | For a presentation of “African socialism” see Friedland/Rosberg 1967; for a 
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safety structures. In other words, much in the same sense in which Marcel 
Mauss had argued in his widely read The Gift (Mauss 1992), Elwert singled 
out these cultural forms as manifestations of a very speciﬁ c type of society.
African societies do not elicit our admiration only on account of the 
preservation of positive traditional social forms. Also in the face of enormous 
adversity, especially in recent years, which expresses itself in the form of 
civil strife, vulnerability to natural disasters and precarious livelihoods, 
Africans appear to document humans’ perseverance and attachment to life. 
In fact there is a sense in which Africa may be understood as the living 
example of what human nature is capable of under duress. Nothing that 
has happened in Africa in the context of adversity – from brutal violence to 
dogged pursuit of individual ends – is atypical of how others have reacted to 
similar situations in other parts of the world. The wars of the eighties and 
nineties in the Balkans as well as the so-called “war on terror” conducted by 
the US and its allies against religiously motivated violence have produced the 
kinds of human conduct which uninformed common sense would associate 
with the images of Africa privileged by mass communication means. That 
in spite of all the adverse conditions Africans come back again and again, 
bears testimony to their resilience, but also to their profound identity with 
the human condition.
This resilience has prompted scholars to look for ways of accounting for 
African social phenomena in terms of their relationship to what has been 
happening to Africans. An adequate appreciation of humanism in Africa 
will indeed have to come to terms with the context within which Africans 
have been looking for their bearings in the world. Accounts have tended to 
emphasize the extent to which African ways of life can be conceptualized 
as negative reactions to concrete historical circumstances. Indeed, while 
some see these ways of life as critical commentaries on modernity (White 
2000), others see them as resistance against capitalism (Comaroﬀ /Comaroﬀ  
1993), and still others speak of retrogression as in the case of James Ferguson 
(Ferguson 1999), who describes his own observations of the collapse of the 
world promised by copper in Zambia as an ethnography of decline. In so 
doing these accounts turn African initiative into a mere expedient reaction to 
circumstances that empty history of any substantive local content. The history 
of Africa becomes, strangely enough, a narrative of misunderstandings 
holding Africans hostage to the role of victims to themselves.
However, what these accounts miss is the very important point that amidst 
the general manifestations of resistance, criticism and decline, history is 
being made in Africa. In fact the history being made is not a history by default, 
as suggested by these accounts. Rather, it is real history, i.e. actually existing 
history, the actions and thoughts of Africans in their attempts at securing 
their existence and giving meaning to their lives. In a certain sense my 
argument should be understood as a critique of a historicist view of African 
life ways. This view pits African ways of life against an established historical 
horizon and that reduces history writing to a long drawn-out commentary on 
how Africa deviated from its pre-ordained path. My argument is informed Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
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by an understanding of history based on the general idea of historicism, i.e. 
a theory of knowledge that engages with social action as it is as a document 
of itself.
Historicist ideas as opposed to historicism are not the privilege of 
external observers of the continent. Men and women who made history in 
Africa have fallen prey to them. The great négritude movement for example, 
the black African literary reaction against colonialism and for racial pride, 
dulled the cutting edge of its own critique by insisting on a timeless African 
history independent of what actually existed. Calls for a return to the roots 
made this clear. Curiously enough, the problem with négritude might not 
have been so much the insistence on racial and cultural essentialism as the 
inability to see the movement itself as the ineluctable historical process that 
is so central to social action. In other words, négritude was no accessory to 
Africans for them to return to their history, but rather yet another turn in 
African history, opening possibilities, widening agency and oﬀ ering new and 
novel beginnings. In his celebrated introduction to the collection of négritude 
writings Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist philosopher, might have 
been the only one to have clearly grasped the historical signiﬁ cance of the 
movement. His image of the “Black Orpheus” (Sartre 1972) was not only 
an ethnocentric bow to the epistemological omniscience of Greek thinking 
and culture, but also, and more importantly, an acknowledgement of the 
historical signiﬁ cance of Africa’s plight. Sartre described the movement as 
history gaining consciousness of itself. What he meant was that the suﬀ ering 
and oppression of Africans could only make sense to the extent that Africans 
were able to draw implications of worldwide signiﬁ cance. In other words, the 
French philosopher was arguing that Africans had become agents of history 
who had been entrusted with the task of redeeming not only the continent, 
but also the whole world. Africans, very much like the proletarians from 
whose Marxist conceptualization Sartre had drawn, suﬀ ered in order to 
impel history forward and deliver the world to its true promise.
While of course Sartre’s Marxist reading of négritude’s historical signiﬁ -
cance was historicist to a degree, he was drawing consequences from an 
understanding of African history which did not reduce social action to an 
artifact of a primordial culture desperately holding on to a world to which it 
did not seem to belong. He was actually adding a theory of knowledge to what 
Africans had been doing for several years, more particularly when returning 
slaves from America began thinking of Africa as a community of values and 
fate (see Macamo 1999). Sartre’s understanding of the signiﬁ cance of négritude 
is consistent with the main thrust of the argument of this paper. Indeed, the 
argument can now be stated in a bolder manner: there is no such thing as an 
essential African humanism. That a culture values solidarity, hospitality and 
respect for others does not make it humanist in any theoretically acceptable 
way. Humanism in fact is a reﬂ exive concept which implies that individuals 
engage critically with their own history and seek to draw lessons for the way 
they lead their lives. In this sense for instance, “Ubunthu” in and of itself is 
not a manifestation of any kind of primordial African humanism. However, Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
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the thinking activity that went into bringing aspects of the black peoples 
of South Africa together to form a coherent critique of their historical 
experience is. In other words, African humanism comes to fruition in the 
manner in which Africans engage with their own historical experience and 
seek to draw lessons thereof. For a better understanding of this argument it 
is necessary to take a cursory look at crucial moments in the development 
and evolution of Africans’ engagement with their experience.
Africans’ Dialogue with Histor y
The most appropriate moment to start from is the point in time when a 
considerable number of former slaves from America start returning to Africa. 
These men and women contributed with their thinking to posit Africa as a sui 
generis category, to paraphrase the Nigerian scholar, Abiola Irele (Irele 1975). 
In so doing they set in motion a historical process which lends itself to being 
understood as the making of humanism in Africa, a humanism born of the 
experience of slavery, colonialism, racism and the struggle for human dignity. 
Two points will be at the centre of this account. The ﬁ rst point consists in the 
argument according to which the search for Africa (see Diawara 1998) plays 
a central role in forming humanist ideas in Africa. This can be hopefully 
demonstrated by drawing from the understanding that returning slaves in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa towards the end of the nineteenth 
century brought to bear on their own condition. Secondly, the formation of 
humanist ideas was profoundly dependent on the elaboration of the idea 
of Africa, which came to stand for a community of values and destiny. On 
this score it is possible to link up with central pragmatic concepts2 such as 
African personality or, for that matter négritude, which perceptive observers 
like the Ghanaian theologian Kwame Bediako (Bediako 1995). have traced 
back to the condition of the possibility of an African nation as experienced 
by returning slaves.
The background to this account is a debate on African philosophy. This 
debate opposed two sides within the African intellectual community. On 
the one side of the barricades there were scholars such as the Rwandan 
historian and linguist, Alexis Kagame and, to a certain extent, the Ugandan 
theologian John Mbiti, who argued for an African Weltanschauung which 
summed up a speciﬁ cally African philosophy. Their position had a pedigree 
which reached back to the writings of missionaries, such as the Belgian 
Placide Tempels – who wrote “La philosophie bantoue” (Tempels 1945) – the 
German anthropologists Jahnheinz Jahn and Leo Frobenius, who in diﬀ erent 
but convergent ways thought that they had identiﬁ ed the true African self. 
Placide Tempels, for example, argued that this philosophy was based on the 
2 | The notion “conceptual pragmatists” refers to one speciﬁ c understanding 
of philosophy within Africa which holds that philosophy is a universal intellectual 
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idea of a life force. The négritude movement took up these ideas and used 
them to argue, as Senghor forcefully did, that Africans were fundamentally 
diﬀ erent from Europeans: “Reason is Greek, emotion is black”, said Senghor 
to the cheers of Europeans who denied reason to Africans.
On the other side of the line stood philosophers such as the Ghanaian 
Kwasi Wiredu, the Nigerian P. Bodunrin and the Beninois Paulin Hountondji 
who insisted that philosophy was much more than a collection of folklore 
and mores. Some of them came to be known as “conceptual pragmatists” 
for insisting that what deﬁ ned philosophy was respect for the universal 
rules of reasoning upon which that intellectual activity was based. By way 
of illustrating this point reference could be made to two arguments. Kwasi 
Wiredu, for example, took exception to an anthropologist, Robin Horton, 
who had argued that African traditional religion could be seen as a kind 
of science on a par with Western science (Horton 1960: 50–71, 155–187). In 
a polemical article with the title “How not to Compare African Traditional 
Thought with Western Science” (Wiredu 1984), Wiredu argued that African 
traditional thought was traditional thought much in the same way that 
traditional thought could be found in every society, including Western 
society. Wiredu felt that comparing this type of thought with science was 
rendering a disservice to the advancement of scientiﬁ c thought in Africa. 
He singled out Senghor and criticized him for his remarks on reason being 
Greek wondering whether by that the great Senegalese poet and statesman 
might not have wanted to prove his point. Paulin Hountondji, on his part, 
rejected the idea of an African philosophy on the basis of what he felt to be an 
attempt to posit a kind of unanimism which in his view was lacking in Africa 
(Hountondji 1983). 
The deeper one delves into the debate, the more one comes to understand 
that it was not just about establishing whether there was an African 
philosophy. One can actually see it as a debate about Africa itself. In other 
words, philosophers were reﬂ ecting upon what it meant to be African. It 
was an act of introspection and a necessary one at that. Indeed, the debate 
could be seen as the third stage of a long process of constituting Africa 
as a community of values and a community of destiny. In the study from 
which I draw this account (cf. Macamo 1999). I identiﬁ ed three main stages, 
namely a religious stage, a political stage and a cultural/philosophical stage. 
I believed, and still believe, that through these stages Africa was constituted 
as a modern construct. Humanism is intimately linked to this historical 
process.
The political stage consisted in the struggle for self-determination. It 
stretched from the end of the 19th century all the way to the 30-year period 
covering the sixties and the eighties – with the ﬁ rst independences which 
culminated with the end of white supremacy rule in South Africa. In this 
political stage Africa was deﬁ ned as a political community under foreign 
rule. The slogans of the time were “Pan-Africanism” – there were Pan African 
congresses in Paris, San Francisco and Manchester. The most famous phrase 
of the time was Nkrumah’s “seek ye ﬁ rst your political kingdom, all else will Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibl othek Base
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follow.” This was the time of political ideologies such as African socialism, 
Ujamaa, Conscientism and Humanism (in Kaunda’s understanding). The 
political stage articulated what had been simmering historically. It gave 
practical substance to Africans’ eﬀ orts to engage with history by seeking 
to bring about the conditions which would enable them to recover their 
human dignity. In the process however, many, especially the intellectuals, 
realized that they were not recovering an essential Africa. Rather they were 
constructing a new Africa fashioned on their existential experience.
Therefore Africa is in a sense a recent phenomenon. It came into being in 
the course of the 19th century. This may sound objectionable, since received 
wisdom would hold that the continent has existed for as long as anyone can 
remember. Africa as a continent inhabited by black folks, was known already 
in antiquity. However, the sense in which Africa should be understood as a 
recent phenomenon refers to the way in which the continent was the outcome 
of historical struggles of an ideological, political and philosophical nature. 
More substantively though, the sense in which Africa can be understood as 
a recent phenomenon is linked to the manner in which it was the outcome of 
people becoming aware of their existential condition and responding actively 
to it. They referred to what was already there, engaged with it and in the 
process, they molded something new: Africa.
The recent nature of Africa can be seen clearly in the travails of returning 
slaves who settled on the West African coast – Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
These were people who had been sold into slavery by their own brethren 
or by Europeans and subjected to the most inhuman treatment that men 
have inﬂ icted upon one another, both on the way to as well as after arriving 
in America. These people came into contact with Christianity, learnt and 
accepted its message of redemption and equality before God. They wondered 
why such a benevolent and forgiving God could have allowed such a fate 
to fall upon them; exactly the theodicy question which Weber identiﬁ ed as 
being at the root of ethical frameworks.
The answer to this existential question was the ﬁ rst stone in the 
construction of Africa. While feeling that slavery was inhuman, they did not 
see it as a curse. They saw a larger purpose behind it. They saw slavery as the 
work of providence. Kwame Nkrumah summed this up nicely in a speech 
held in Liberia in 1952: 
I pointed out that it was providence that had preserved the Negroes during their 
years of trial in exile in the United States of America and the West Indies; that 
it was the same providence which took care of Moses and the Israelites in Egypt 
centuries before. “A greater exodus is coming in Africa today”, I declared, “and 
that exodus will be established when there is a united, free and independent 
West Africa […]” (Nkrumah 1973: 153)
God had allowed these men and women to be sold into slavery so that they 
could learn Christianity and a new ways of life. These men and women 
were destined to liberate their brethren from the darkness they had lived in Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
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up until then. Most of the writings of the time are full of biblical imagery. 
Slavery is seen as the exodus and the return to Africa is the return to the 
Promised Land. Slaves were the “chosen people”, in fact Edward Blyden, one 
of the most vigorous writers of the group, even went as far as to argue that 
Africa as a whole had been chosen by God to liberate the world. This is the 
argument that would be taken up later, albeit clad in Marxist terminology, by 
Jean-Paul Sartre, who argued that history had chosen the black man to lead 
the way into all men’s emancipation. Even the naked people they encountered 
in the African hinterland symbolized, in the eyes of former slaves, the state 
of innocence Africans were still in.
To the extent that the search for Africa was concerned with redeeming 
the continent, its people and the rest of the world, it contained within itself 
the seeds of humanism in Africa. But what was this Africa that they were 
supposed to redeem and how were they going to do it? This Africa did not 
exist, yet it did. It did not exist in the sense of a politically, economically and 
socially coherent territorial community. Africa was a collection of fragmented 
polities, each pursuing its own interests and worshipping its own deities. 
Alexander Crummell, an Episcopalian minister who had settled in Liberia 
and a powerful spokesperson of the returned slaves for example, went as far 
as to say:
Africa is the victim of her heterogeneous idolatries. Africa is wasting away 
beneath the accretions of moral and civil miseries. Darkness covers the land and 
gross darkness the people. Great social evils universally prevail. Conﬁ dence and 
security are destroyed. Licentiousness abounds everywhere. Moloch rules and 
reigns throughout the whole continent, and by the ordeal of Sassywood, Fetiches, 
human sacriﬁ ces and devil-worship is devouring men, women, and little children. 
The people of Africa, […] have not the Gospel. They are living without God. The 
Cross has never met their gaze […] (quoted in Appiah 1992: 35)
Yet, Africa existed as a promise, as a community ready to be called into being. 
It fell upon those God had chosen to lead their brethren – former slaves – 
to identify the commonalities that would show them the way. Crummel’s 
contemporary, E. W. Blyden, (quoted in Mudimbe 1988: 110) wrote:
It is the feeling of race – the aspiration after the development on its own 
line of the type of humanity to which we belong. Italians and Germans long 
yearned after such development. The Slavonic tribes are feeling after it. Now 
nothing tends more to discourage these feelings and check these aspirations 
than the idea that the people with whom we are connected, and after whose 
improvement we sigh, have never had a past, or only an ignoble past – 
antecedents which were ‘blank and hopeless’, to be ignored and forgotten.
Race was a central element of this nascent African nation in the minds of 
returned slaves. In fact they have been strongly criticized by Kwame Appiah, 
an African philosopher of Ghanaian origin on, for example, their “racism” 
and “racialism” (Appiah 1992). Indeed, their most powerful justiﬁ cation for Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
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an African nation was this common notion of race. They were so concerned 
about the purity of this notion that they were frightfully bigoted about 
anything in between, which is why they would call former slaves of mixed 
race “mongrels”. Race was important, but so was a shared history of suﬀ ering 
and a yearning for “improvement”, as they often put it.
As the chosen people they were to be the go-between for Europeans 
and their black and pagan brethren. Hence Blyden’s passionate invitation 
to freed slaves in America to come and claim their land. In the run-up to 
the Berlin conference, which took place from 1884 to 1885, for example, they 
still kept the hope that Africa’s future might be entrusted to them. It was in 
fact the Berlin conference coupled with the realization that Europe meant to 
avail itself of Africa’s riches that paved the way for the radicalization of their 
discourse, culminating in the political stage that I mentioned earlier.
In concluding this section it can be said that Africa was understood as 
a community of values and also as a community of destiny. Former slaves 
were to nurture it as part and parcel of the mission which God, in his inﬁ nite 
wisdom, had entrusted upon them.
Humanism in Africa was profoundly linked to the attempt at ﬁ nding a 
place for Africa within an adverse historical process. Returning slaves lent 
substance to this understanding by deﬁ ning Africa in a very speciﬁ c way, 
namely as a community of values and destiny. What led them to this was 
their existential condition. This was the result of historical forces that fell 
upon the continent from the end of the 15th century onwards.
Elsewhere I argue that Africa is a modern phenomenon (Macamo 1999). 
This is because it emerged as a community of values and destiny out of a 
conscious dialogue between people and their own situation. Indeed, if 
reﬂ exivity is an intrinsic part of modernity then Africa is a particularly 
poignant example of that. A Swedish political scientist, Björn Wittrock 
(Wittrock 2000: 31-60), has deﬁ ned modernity as a set of promissory notes 
waiting to be cashed in. Africa as a modern construct resulted from the attempt 
by a very speciﬁ c group of people, the returned slaves, to make modernity 
live up to its promise of liberty, progress and justice. It gained texture from 
the way in which these people engaged with their surroundings.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have been concerned to claim that a proper appreciation of 
humanism in Africa requires a conceptual framework which is still in need 
of development. My suggestion is that humanism in Africa is deeply related 
with the conditions under which Africa took shape as a community of fate and 
values. In other words, drawing from my earlier work on the philosophical 
debate concerning the issue as to whether there is an African philosophy, I 
submit that just as Africa is a modern construct, the fate of humanism in 
Africa is coupled with the historical conditions of the possibility of Africa 
as a modern construct. Indeed, humanism is what remains – perhaps what Ber itgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
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should remain – once all the fallen bodies throughout the course of history 
have been counted.
To be sure, this is not a conclusion. Rather it is an indication of the kinds of 
conceptual, theoretical and analytical paths which discussions of humanism 
in Africa should take. It is a statement of work to be done. This work should 
engage in a more vigorous manner with African life ways and tradition 
with a view to understanding their precise relationship. Not everything 
that is African is traditional, but a clear understanding of tradition might 
caution us against light hearted conclusions about the relationship between 
humanism and African life ways. Equally important is the worthwhile 
attempt at understanding discussions of the nature of African society as can 
be found in several writings of very inﬂ uential anthropologists, missionaries 
and travelers. The writings of Leo Frobenius, Jahnheinz Jahn, Placide 
Tempels, David Livingstone and others are crucial to such an enterprise. 
They lie at the root of subsequent and more recent attempts at recovering 
the essence of African life ways. These writings were not inconsequential, 
and for this reason they deserve to be read and discussed at length as part 
of the eﬀ orts to appreciate humanism in Africa. This appreciation should 
include a consideration of Africans themselves, some of whom have been 
brieﬂ y discussed in this paper, as part of the attempt to understand how they 
responded to the challenges of history.
Only such an endeavor can hold the promise of a clear understanding of 
humanism in Africa.
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 13.11.18 16:59
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 13.11.18 16:59
